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ABSTRACT
As the world’s predominant navigation system GPS is critical to
modern life, finding applications in diverse areas like information
security, healthcare, marketing, and power and water grid man-
agement. Unfortunately this diversification has only served to un-
derscore the insecurity of GPS and the critical need to harden this
system against manipulation and exploitation. A wide variety of at-
tacks against GPS have already been documented, both in academia
and industry. Several defenses have been proposed to combat these
attacks, but they are ultimately insufficient due to scope, expense,
complexity, or robustness. With this in mind, we present our own
solution: fingerprinting of GPS satellites. We assert that it is pos-
sible to create signatures, or fingerprints, of the satellites (more
specifically their transmissions) that allow one to determine nearly
instantly whether a received GPS transmission is authentic or not.
Furthermore, in this paper we demonstrate that this solution de-
tects all known spoofing attacks, that it does so while being fast,
cheap, and simpler than previous solutions, and that it is highly
robust with respect to environmental factors.
KEYWORDS
Signal Fingerprinting, Spoofing Detection, GPS
1 INTRODUCTION
GPS, in its original role as a navigational aid, can be found in ev-
erything from smartphones to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
This alone would merit the attention of security researchers. Today
trackers use it to trace the movement of entities, games and stream-
ing services use it for localizing advertisements, secure facilities
use it to “geo-fence” their equipment, and power grids use it for
phase synchronization. Put simply, there are very few aspects of
modern life that are not deeply dependent upon GPS.
In order to spur the growth of GPS and ease its adoption by the
private sector, all aspects of the design and implementation of the so-
called L1 C/A (“Coarse Acquisition”) signal were made public. GPS—
“...the most popular unauthenticated protocol in the world.”[17]—
has since become the primary Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS). Allowing anyone to acquire a detailed understanding of
GPS with very little effort, combined with the relatively trusting
nature of GPS transmitter/receiver interaction, makes the system
ripe for manipulation and catastrophic exploitation. As such, we
must harden GPS as a matter of national security.
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Several methods that attempt to provide post hoc security for
GPS exist in the literature [31]. Our approach uses physical-layer
identification (PLI), aka device fingerprinting, and falls within the
category of correlation profile anomaly detection. There is a long
history in using device fingerprinting for securing transceivers [14]
and satellites are an example of such transceivers. We introduce
Spotr, a GPS spoofing detection via device fingerprinting that is able
to determine the authenticity of GPS signals based on their physical-
layer similarity to signals that are known to have originated from
GPS satellites. We extract strong features from the outputs of the
complex correlators common to all GPS receivers and use them to
generate templates for the genuine satellite signals, which we call
fingerprints. Finding a strong fingerprint for genuine GPS signals is
non-trivial, since a spoofing adversary always tries to mimic the
characteristics of the authentic signal to the best of their capability.
We introduce simple (but difficult to spoof) features here, yet we
are able to detect the most powerful spoofing attacks with high
accuracy and in a timely fashion. Our main contributions are:
• We detect all the existing spoofing attacks on different di-
mension of GPS receivers in literature (time and/or position)
using a single channel/receiver.
• We are able to track a genuine satellite over different days,
environmental conditions, and locations, such as urban and
rural settings, with and without multipath propagation ef-
fects. Our method does not require channel modelling, which
reduces its complexity. We are only limited to having a good
observation of the signal to perform device fingerprinting.
• Since we use fingerprinting, we do not impose a lower-bound
on the range of spoofing detection. This is an improvement
to the state-of-the-art spoofing detectors which fail to find
attacks up to the range of 1000m.
Our spoofing detector functions properly regardless of the number
of devices that the spoofer is utilizing. This enables us to detect co-
ordinated attacks on multilateration systems (estimation of distance
based on time of arrival of waveforms travelling at a known speed
[21]). Our approach is purely passive with nomodifications required
to the existing GPS protocol, satellite orbits or uplink/downlink
communication channels. We also make our dataset of genuine and
spoofed GPS signals available for the community.
1.1 Related Work
The public availability of civil GPS implementation details has made
it trivial to accurately and reliably (re)create navigational data in-
telligible to any GPS receiver. What’s more, these receivers are
not only inherently trusting and accept any GPS signal they can
demodulate, but the automatic gain control (AGC) system in the
standard GPS receiver is designed to favor (lock onto) the strongest
signals. While this behavior may seem intuitive, it also assumes –
dangerously – a benign environment which means that a malicious
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attacker can easily assert control over a receiver simply by using a
closer, more energetic signal to overpower the weaker, authentic
signals. This is known as the overpower attack and it is the focus of
most detection and mitigation strategies. Numerous lines of defense
are given in [17, 31] which can be broadly categorized as crypto-
graphic, hardware-specific or signal processing-based solutions.
Non-predictable modulation techniques are proposed to over-
come the problem of open signal structure in [30, 38]. These are
mostly cryptography-based methods that, while valid, depend on
modifications to the space segment. As such, the costs involved
with redevelopment or even modification of satellites in situ render
these solutions impractical despite their effectiveness.
Jamming, often seen as a threat to GPS, can also be a standalone,
non-cryptographic line of defense against GPS spoofing. One such
approach uses jamming-to-noise (J/N) sensors that are inexpensive
and easy to build. The sensors mark activity as malicious if the
energy of the in-band signal exceeds a given threshold, which forces
the spoofer to limit its power and makes the overpower attack far
more difficult to maintain. This defense is probabalistic, however, as
a carefully crafted spoofer could still employ more nuanced power
adjustments and it would be unwise for one to assume anything
less than maximum determination in an adversary [17, 37].
Hardware-based solutions include those that augment GPS re-
ceivers with additional antennae or inertial sensors. The single/
multiple antenna methods are fast and reliable, but are expensive
and require modifications to current receivers and redesign of fu-
ture receivers [20, 27, 35]. For their own part, the inertial sensors
create a new accuracy concern as their measurements are tempera-
ture sensitive and thus subject to drift depending on environmental
factors [10].
Another set of defense methods implement spread spectrum
security code (SSSC) or navigation message authentication (NMA)
on wide area augmentation system (WAAS) [11]. WAAS is an air
navigation aid developed by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to augment GPS in order to increase its accuracy, integrity,
and availability. With no modifications to the space segment of the
GPS, this is strong enough to stop the spoofer because SSSC is a
strong high rate security code, however, it cannot authenticate a
full three-dimensional navigation solution. Long delay is another
drawback of SSSC if used in aviation. NMAs, easier to implement
compared to SSSC, are slightly less secure with equal delay [23].
A recent alternative solution is theMulti-SystemMulti-Frequency
defense. Secondary to the U.S. Air Forces’s ongoing GPS modern-
ization project, civilian GPS signals are now being transmitted on
other bands such as L2 and L5 in addition to the legacy L1. The
signals at L2 and L5 can be used for consistency check of the signal
at L1, which makes spoofing more challenging [25].
Correlation profile anomaly detection is a different approach
which mainly relies on the difficulty of suppressing the genuine
GPS signals and the fact that even the strongest spoofer fails at
exactly mimicking the authentic GPS signal’s behaviour. This helps
to find anomalies and use them to detect spoofing activities. It is a
low cost software solution which eliminates the need for additional
hardware. This method is known to function efficiently for station-
ary receivers, while its performance is influenced by propagation
effects of the wireless channel such as multipath and fading [19].
In a similar way, a PLI-based method for spoofing attacks is given
at [28] where the frequency offset and transient phase noise of
the attacker’s radio are the main features for detection, which are
weaker than the correlator outputs used in the present work as
they are more susceptible to spoofing.
Some techniques attempt to secure the GPS C/A signals using
the existing military signals which are not cost-efficient [32].
Numerous attacks have already been demonstrated on the GPS
system, strongest of which is a seamless lock takeover attack [35]
where the attacker takes over the target receiver gradually, by
avoiding abrupt changes which might lead to detection. SPREE is
introduced at [33] which is a spoofing resistant GPS receiver, able
to limit the state-of-the-art spoofing attacks up until 2016 including
seamless lock takeover attack [35] . It introduces a spoofing detec-
tion technique named auxiliary peak tracking (APT) which operates
next to the second module of SPREE named navigation message
inspector (NMI). Unlike ordinary, SPREE acquires and tracks all of
the signals (the strongest and the weaker ones), and uses NMI to
look for discrepancies in the content of the navigation messages to
detect possible attacks. It contributes to the security of GPS systems
by limiting the range of spoofing attacks on position to the radius
of 1000m. This is accomplished at the cost of using more than one
channel to acquire, track and decode each satellite’s signal, which
also requires modifications to the GPS receiver. The main challenge
for SPREE is to distinguish the auxiliary peak of a spoofing signal
from that of a multipath component of a genuine GPS signal. This
makes it difficult for SPREE to cancel the spoofing signal due to
uncertainties at identifying the source of the signal. SPREE also
relies on the presence of the authentic signals (assuming that these
signals are not already suppressed by the attacker) which makes it
vulnerable to attacks which nullify the authentic signals.
In a similar way, Vestigial Signal Defense (VSD) [39] attempts
to detect spoofing based on analyzing the distortions present in
the output of the receiver’s complex correlation function. VSD
faces challenges to distinguish these distortions from legitimate
multipath components. Other similar detection strategies which
rely on inherent spatial characteristics of the received signal ( e.g.
angle of arrival [26]) face the same challenges. Simpler spoofing
detection strategies that look for anomalies in the physical-layer
characteristics of the received signal such as abrupt changes in
power level of the received signal or the AGC value [1] are usually
not able to detect a spoofer which has proper control over its signal.
1.2 Paper Structure
Section 2 covers the types of attacks that we address. Sec. 3 pro-
vides a background on GPS and describes our defense methodology
where we introduce Spotr with device fingerprinting for detecting
spoofing attacks. Same section covers the feature extraction and the
real-time spoofing detection process. Data collection is explained at
Sec. 4. Experimental validation of Spotr is discussed at Sec. 5, where
we also do a feature stability analysis to examine their consistency
on different conditions before we conclude at Sec. 6.
2 ATTACK MODEL
We envision a physical-layer attack where the objective of the at-
tacker is to induce a different position, velocity, and/or time (PVT)
solution in a targeted civilian GPS receiver. A spoofing attacker is
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Figure 1: (a) Overview of satellite fingerprinting, spoofing detection. (b) Block diagram of GPS receiver. (c) RF front-end of GPS
receiver. (d) Spotr overview of defense.
able to craft digitally valid GPS signals indistinguishable from gen-
uine ones, inject them into a wireless channel, and produce a valid
PVT at the victim. A replay attacker, on the other hand, captures
analog data from genuine satellites and replays it to the victim.
The latter is a stronger attack since it replicates the subtle intrinsic
features of a genuine signal. The attacker is aware of the location of
the target receiver. In both cases, if a receiver locks to the fake satel-
lite (signal) then the attacker can choose a desired/altered PVT. We
note that GPS signal generators that would enable this are readily
available.We do not place any artificial restrictions on the attacker’s
ability to generate and inject signals: the spoofed signal may be
greater in power than the genuine GPS signals (“over-powered”),
at a slightly higher power level (“matched-powered”), at a lower
power level (“under-powered”) in case of a near-instantaneous
switch from an exclusively authentic stream into an exclusively
spoofed one, and/or phase aligned to enable “seamless” takeovers
[18, 19]. This maximizes the chances of an attacker to remain un-
detected while enabling all of the attacks discussed in [33]. Finally,
a replay attacker is able to adjust power levels and create signals
with correlation outputs as close as possible to genuine ones.
3 SATELLITE SPOOFING DETECTION
Here, we will describe our physical-layer based spoofing detection
scheme, Spotr. Feature extraction is the most essential step in de-
signing a PLI system. We start this out by finding simple, yet strong
features that make the detection possible while cutting down on
the complexity. Next, we use an offline training-testing scheme to
generate thresholds and use them for real-time detection of spoofed
or tracking of genuine GPS signals. Fig. 1a shows overview of a PLI
system in context of satellite spoofing detection, detailed below.
3.1 GPS Receiver
Fig. 1b illustrates a block diagram of a GPS receiver. The main
components of GPS receiver are (i) RF front-end, (ii) acquisition
module, (iii) tracking module, and (iv) PVT estimator module. The
RF front-end investigates if satellite signals are available. The ac-
quisition module searches for the delayed versions of any satellite’s
pseudo random noise (PRN) sequence while estimating the Doppler
shift and compensating for it. PRNs are codes used to differentiate
the signals generated from different satellites in a code division
multiple access (CDMA) system. The role of a tracking block is to
follow the evolution of the signal synchronization parameters: code
phase, Doppler shift and carrier phase. As a main component of
tracking block, the VOLK-Library [12] from gnss-sdr, is responsible
for running the delay locked loop (DLL) and phase locked loop (PLL)
at the GPS receiver. It runs at a varying speed in a feedback system
based on the quality of tracking in that instance. The PVT estimator
uses this to report a solution on position, time and velocity. The
most common method to do so is called multilateration, where an
accurate estimate of location coordinates of a GPS transmitter plus
time requires data from at least four satellites [22].
3.2 Feature Selection Rationale
GNSS receivers are composed of an analog RF front-end and a dig-
ital part. Fig. 1c illustrates the block diagram of the RF front-end
with an automatic gain control (AGC) component right before the
Analog-to-Digital converter (ADC). AGC is an adaptive feedback
loop system that uses a variable-gain amplifier (VGA) in-order to
provide consistent inputs to the ADC [3]. This consistency makes
correlators a good observation point for feature extraction. A po-
tential optimal detector, to determine the presence of a valid signal,
is a matched-filter, which maximizes the signal-to-noise ratio of a
known input signal in additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) [7].
Earlier work in fingerprinting satellites uses weaker features,
such as modulation imperfections or AGC parameters, that are
known to be vulnerable to low-cost spoofing attacks [6, 8]. Corre-
lator outputs 1, however, require better resourced attackers with
arbitrary waveform generators (AWGs) [15]. In an effort to mimic
such an attacker we perform matched-powered replay attacks in
Sec. 5.2. Given their security, together with the theory of operation
of the AGC, make the correlation outputs reliable features (Fig. 2a).
3.3 Feature Extraction
Based on documentation of GPS, we have samples after I-Q demod-
ulation at the RF front-end which contain information on the P(Y)
1GPS uses direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) modulation. For the purpose of de-
modulation and de-spreading, correlators are required in the receiver design. Therefore,
they are an inherent part of any GPS receiver.
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Figure 2: (a) EPL correlator outputs for GPS digital receiver [12], the observation point of Spotr. (b) Output of P correlator.
and C/A code, the military and civilian codes, respectively. The
output of the matched-filter correlation, Mo would be
Mo = (I + jQ) × (Irep − jQrep)
= (I × Irep +Q ×Qrep) + j (Q × Irep −Qrep × I ) (1)
where rep shows the replica of the PRN code in the receiver. Given
the right-hand-side of the equation, if there is a match, the real
part will hold a large enough value and the imaginary part will
be close to zero which will result in a lock at the tracking block.
There are three of such correlators shown in Fig. 2a, named early,
prompt, and late correlators called E, P and L. A sample of the real
and imaginary part of the P correlator is given at Fig. 2b where
we will focus on the real part which holds most of the information
from the satellite. The ideal value of the imaginary part is zero [24].
The gnss-sdr receiver uses two metrics to validate the signal
quality to generate a lock, named the code-lock-detector (CN0) and
carrier-lock-detector (CLT). The CN0 test is defined as
Ĉ/N 0dB−Hz
lock
≷
no lock
γcode , (2)
where Ĉ/N 0 is an estimate of C/N0 = CN
BW
(C is the carrier power,
N is the noise power and BW is the bandwidth of observation)
which is the carrier-to-noise density ratio and refers to the ratio of
the carrier power and the noise power per unit of bandwidth. The
threshold γcode is set to 32 dB-Hz here. The the lock detector test
for the carrier tracking loop is defined as,
cos(2∆̂ϕ) lock≷
no lock
γcarr ier , (3)
where ∆ϕ = ϕ − ϕˆ is the carrier phase error. If the estimate of the
cosine of twice the carrier phase error is above a certain threshold,
the loop is declared in lock. The threshold γcarr ier is set to 0.5
radians. This is referred to as CLT in our data collection software
at Sec. 4. Fig. 3a shows the histograms of the CN0 and CLT, which
are used for deciding on the thresholds.
After filtering out the sample points that fail the above lock
tests, we look into the real values of the EPL correlator outputs to
generate strong features for each satellite. For each correlator, we
separate the points above zero and the ones below zero as high/low
sample points and we will have features of six dimensions which is
high and low sample points of EPL correlator outputs. Feature one is
high of E correlator, feature two is low of E correlator, feature three
is high of P correlator, feature four is low of P correlator, feature
five is high of L correlator, and feature six is low of L correlator.
Histogram of features 5 and 6 is shown at Fig. 3b.
3.4 Multivariate Normal Distribution
As discussed in Sec. 3.3 we are dealing with high dimensional data.
In order to describe the characteristics of this data we apply a
multivariate normal distribution (MVN) [4] to each dataset. For a
set of {µ, Σ} that we assign, the MVN score is calculated by Eq. 4.
Gaussian distribution fits the closest to our features, one example
of which is plotted in Fig. 3b. We hypothesize that the features are
correlated and we intend to capture this relation between them, that
is the reason we choose MVN as the scoring metric. It is the main
metric for measuring similarity in our work and translates to how
close each observation from a dataset is to a specific distribution.
fx (x1,x2, · · · ,xk ) =
exp
(
− 12 (x − µ)T Σ−1 (x − µ)
)
√
(2π )k |Σ|
. (4)
To guarantee a clear separation between the genuine GPS signals
and the spoofed ones in different weather conditions or locations,
we use the average MVN score from multiple sample points. Fig. 3c
shows the effect of using a single sample point for comparison
versus using the average of 100 sample points. The lower graph
shows a better separation between the genuine and spoofed signals.
Algorithm 1: Feature Extraction
Generating a feature template F for each satellite
for Each PRN i > 1 do
Collect the outputs of EPL correlators
Fi ← high and low of EPL outputs
Apply code-lock-detector test (Eq.2)
Apply carrier-lock-detector test (Eq.3)
F ← F ∪ Fi
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Figure 3: (a) Histogram of CN0 andCLT for SatGrid:S10 (see Tables 3 and 4 for details on the datasets). (b) Late correlator output
for PRN23 of TexBat:S8. (c) Using average of multiple features to create separation between spoofed and genuine signals.
Hence, in the experimental evaluations at Sec. 5 wewill use multiple
sample points (shown by n) and average their MVN scores.
3.5 Real-time Detection
We design our PLI-based spoofing detector in two main steps. First,
we do a training and testing procedure which results in thresholds
for identification of genuine satellite signals from the spoofed ones.
Next, we train the detector to trigger once an anomaly is observed
using these thresholds in real-time manner.
Training: In this step we use 400 sample points observed from a
spoof-free dataset and generate a template set of features calculated
according to Sec. 3.3. We use these training features to fit an MVN
distribution for the genuine GPS signals. We assume training is
secure, which is accomplished by collecting data at known locations.
Testing:We calculate the MVN score for each observation from
the spoofed GPS dataset. A low MVN score is an indication of
spoofing in the GPS signal. To define a threshold and finalize the
spoofing detection process, we conduct a binary search algorithm
to find a threshold that corresponds to equal error rates (EER). EER
is a measure of performance for bio-metric systems which indicates
a condition in which the false positive rates (FPR) equal to false
negative rates (FNR). An ideal value for EER would be zero [5].
K-fold Cross Validation: Using the training-testing procedure
explained above, we define an extended threshold which identifies
all the genuine GPS signals from the spoofed ones for all but a
specific dataset. Next, we validate this threshold by calculating the
MVN scores for that dataset, and perform the detection process
using this threshold. Then, we look into the FPR and FNR to evaluate
how well this threshold functions on this dataset which was not
included during the training phase. This procedure is repeated for
all K-1 datasets, and is called K-fold cross validation [4].
Real-time Detection: The offline defined thresholds in the pre-
vious steps are used to trigger the spoofing detector. The receiver
generates the features for each sample point and the MVN score of
these features based on the distribution of genuine satellite signals.
If this score falls below the threshold, the sample will be dropped,
otherwise it will be passed over to the next GPS receiver blocks.
Fig. 1d gives an overview of defense for Spotr, and Algorithm 2
explains the details of steps mentioned above.
3.6 Time Complexity Analysis
We use a very simple feature extraction algorithm with all of the op-
erations performed in time domain which eliminates computational
complexity. The feature extraction given at Alg. 1 imposes time
Algorithm 2: Overview of Proposed Approach: Training, Test-
ing, and Real-time Detection/Tracking
Training:
for dataset i do
Fi ← feature extraction Alg. 1
F← F ∪ Fi trained
MVN(µ, Σ) ← fit MVN on x% of F
scMVN ← the density values for the remaining F on
MVN(µ, Σ)
threshold ← EER analysis on scMVN
Testing:
MVN(µ, Σ) ← Training
for sample point i do
Fi ← feature extraction Alg. 1
sciMVN ← density values of Fi on MVN(µ, Σ)
K-fold Cross Validation:
Fi ← feature extraction Alg. 1
for each dataset i do
for The remaining datasets j(j!=i) do
threshold ← EER analysis at Training
MVN(µ, Σ) ← EER analysis at Training
sciMVN ← probability of Fi matching to MVN(µ, Σ)
FPR, FNR← apply threshold to sciMVN
Real-time Detection: decision making procedure:
F ← extract average features for n sample points, Alg. 1
MVN(µ, Σ) ← Training
threshold ← Training
scMVN ← density values ofF if generated from MVN(µ, Σ)
if scMVN > threshold then
Authentic sample point
else
Malicious sample point
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complexity of O (1). Training an MVN model using the training
sample points requires covariance matrix calculations and matrix
inversion operations with time complexity of O
(
n3
)
. However all
this can be done offline. This cuts down the complexity of our algo-
rithm to fitting a single sample point into an already trained MVN
model after feature extraction to O (1).
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we briefly discuss the organization of GPS naviga-
tional messages, followed by the details of our experimental setup
and method of data collection. Our datasets, summarized in Tables 3
and 4, encompass variations over many months and environmental
conditions. The tables contain specifications of the genuine and
spoofed datasets, respectively.
4.1 GPS Data Segmentation
A GPS transmission is broken into 5 sub-frames that update at
varying intervals with an average duration of 6 s each. The first
sub-frame contains information on the health and accuracy of the
satellite, GPS timing information, and any clock corrections. The
second and third sub-frames contain ephemeris data (orbital mea-
surements) for the transmitting satellite. The fourth sub-frame
contains abbreviated almanac data for satellites 25 through 32, as
well as ionospheric and UTC data, satellite configuration, and any
special messages. The fifth and final sub-frame contains abbreviated
almanac data for satellites 1 through 24 and the time and week num-
ber of the almanac itself. Note that sub-frames four and five require
approximately 12.5mins to complete, which means sub-frames one,
two, and three will update many times during this period. For the
attacker to spoof a successful PVT solution, continuous spoofing
of between 18 s and 30 s is required. See the GPS governing agency
[36] or [9, 16, 21] for more details.
4.2 Experimental Hardware
We have live data and replay data collections. Our receivers are the
B210, the B205mini, and the X300 software-defined radios (SDRs)
from Ettus Research. For live signal collection we use the X300,
which includes a GPS-Disciplined Oscillator (GPSDO) and a UX-160
daughterboard. Two inexpensive ($˜10) GPS antennae are used, one
connected to the RX2 port of the daughterboard and one connected
directly to the GPSDO. For our replay (spoofing) sessions we use
the B210 (USB connection) as the transmitter and the X300 (gigabit
Ethernet connection) as the receiver. The two radios are connected
(See Fig.4) via SMA-terminated coaxial cabling that begin at the
TX/RX port of the B210, pass through a varying attenuator, and end
at the RX2 port of the X300. Wired connections like this offer an
ideal transmission for the attacker because the channel propagation
effects do not influence the signaling of the attacker’s radio.
4.3 Experimental Software
Our data collection software is GNSS-SDR [12], an open source
application for GNSS research using SDRs. Signal parameters are
set via a configuration file which allows us to specify parameters
such as carrier frequency, sampling rate, and data type. Most im-
portantly, we can arrange for each of the eight available channels
to lock only with a specified PRN, ensuring that we can single out
each satellite for individual tracking. PRNs are selected based on
optimum viewing angle (e.g. as close to directly overhead as possi-
ble) and their positions are correlated between an online tracking
website (https://in-the-sky.org) and an Android app (GPS Test) [2].
GPS-SDR-SIM [29], another open source application, is our pri-
mary means of both generating rudimentary sets of spoofed data
and for transmitting said data over the wired connection. This appli-
cation allows one to present a GPS ephemeris file (via a repository
maintained by NASA), specify time, date, location, and duration
variables, and then generate authentic GPS binary data ready for
transmission. One issue we encountered is that while the software
does generate viable GPS NAV messages and we can successfully
spoof a location with them, the software is not meant to address
PRN authenticity. As such, we modify this application to allow for
greater specificity in the data generated resulting in a spoofed signal
accurate in time, location, and PRNs received. Our modifications
will be shared for use by the security community.
A summary of the genuine and spoofed GPS data (SatGrid) that
we collected using our setup is given in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
The collection date for the spoofed data corresponds to the date that
the genuine data was acquired, not when it was actually replayed.
We discuss this in more detail in Sec. 5.
4.4 Second-Party Data: UT-Austin TexBat
Repository
Several works in the field of GPS security are tested against de-facto
standard of a publicly available repository of GPS signal spoofing
traces called Texas Spoofing Battery (TexBat) [19]. The dataset
is provided by the Radionavigation Lab at Univ. of Texas-Austin,
including 10 rounds of data collection with a duration of 400 s each
where the first 100 s being spoof-free, sampled at 25Msps with a
16 bit resolution for complex values. TexBat includes two rounds of
separate spoof-free data, which are categorized based on mobility
of the platform as clean static and clean dynamic. Clean static data
collected from a reference antenna located in a building, while the
clean dynamic data is recorded from an antenna mounted atop a
vehicle traveling in Austin, TX. The rest of the datasets, are spoofed
data with different attacks in time and/or position [19] which haveNov8 - round1 (t m stamps)
GPS receiver antenna
Power 
 Supply
UPS
USRP 
x300
Attacker: USRP-B210
USRP -X300 GPS receiver
(a)
Nov8 - round1 (timestamps)
GPS receiver antenna
Power 
 Supply
UPS
USRP 
x300
Attacker: USRP-B210
USRP -X300 GPS receiver
(b)
Figure 4: (a) Genuine data collection setup (b) Spoofing setup.
An Ettus X300 USRP is served as the GPS device finger-
printer, and a B210 USRP for generating the spoofing data.
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as low as meter level alignment with the genuine signals. TexBat
induces a 600m position offset, and 2 µs error in time.
In this work we test Spotr on TexBat data in addition to our
dataset (SatGrid). First, because it provides a fair comparison plat-
form for security researchers and helps them go beyond statistical
analysis methods for testing their solutions. The detection methods
which were limited to verify the null hypothesis (no attack) before,
were then able to test alternate hypothesis thanks to the spoofing
data of TexBat. Second, the UT spoofer that generates the TexBat
data (Table 4), is a strong attacker which is diverse in terms of
dimensions of the genuine GPS signals that it targets to attack.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we evaluate Spotr on different available attack sce-
narios operating at different conditions of time, location, multipath
richness, and/or hardware. For reference, Tables 3 and 4 summa-
rize all genuine and spoofed data respectively, both our own live
recordings and the Univ. of Texas-Austin “TexBat” [19] repository.
We follow two main objectives in fingerprinting the GPS signals
using the features that we introduced at Sec. 3.3. First, to identify
a genuine satellite signal from a spoofed one, referred to as detec-
tion. Second, to prove the consistency of these features by tracking
the signals from a genuine satellite on different conditions, called
tracking. We evaluate the detection and tracking capability of Spotr
on different types of attacks on GPS signals listed at Table 4. First
we evaluate a spoofing attacker over different environmental condi-
tions in Sec. 5.1. Next, Spotr is evaluated against the stronger replay
attacker with more insights on the success rate of the attacker in
inducing falsified PVT solutions in Sec. 5.2. We cannot compare
the error rates with state-of-the-art, because they report results
using higher level metrics, such as the maximum location offset
[6, 34]. See Sec. 1.1 for details on SPREE which limits the range
of spoofing attacks on position to the radius of 1000 m, whereas
we report maximum continuous spoofing time of 47.3 s in Sec.5.2.
Also, our low error rates are indicative of the fact that circuitry of a
satellite is different from an SDR (D1) or non-SDR (D2,D3) spoofer.
For the scenarios in Table 1 the training and testing column
include the general dataset information, followed by the genuine
datasets from devicem (Dm) labeled by Dm:Gx and spoofed datasets
collected from Dm labeled by Dm:Sx, with x being the dataset index
in the Tables 3 and 4. For the cases that only one dataset is reported
(e.g. TexBat:S5) the first 100 s is spoof-free.
Note that the low values on the Y-axis of all the figures are due to
the high dimensionality of the data (six). The MVN density values
close to the maximum achievable MVN score are interpreted as
high scores. For example, the maximum achievable MVN score of
Fig. 5b is 6e-27 which is calculated by using a given Σ of the training
data, k = 6 and x = µ with Eq. 4.
5.1 Evaluation and Discussion
We evaluate Spotr against spoofing attacker over different times,
locations, multipath conditions, and the fingerprinter device being
used in the data collection setup, in the following.
5.1.1 Detection and Tracking over Time. After generating features
based on Sec. 3.3, we randomly select 40,000 samples from Sat-
Grid:G1 and SatGrid:S1 (Spoofing-Attacker) on Sep 24, 2018 in
Blacksburg and fit an MVN model using Eq. 4 to train a µ and Σ.
Next, we use the remaining data on the same day to do EER analysis
on the MVN scores, and train an identification/detection threshold.
Note that, as many sample points as needed (shown by n) to achieve
an EER of zero (the ideal value for EER) are used in all of the cases,
which is reported in the X-axis label of the graphs if required.
Next, we use the trainedMVNmodel and the threshold to test the
genuine and spoofed data collected on different days using the same
spoofer at Blacksburg in consecutive days right after the training,
also after one year on Sep 10, 2019 at Arlington (SatGrid:G23). Fig. 5b
shows the MVN scores associated with this analysis. We observe
that without any averaging on the sample points, all of the genuine
data have MVN scores above the trained threshold while the MVN
scores of spoofed data are mostly zero (which is the reason they
are not printed in the graph with logarithmic scale on Y-axis). This
allows us to conclude that we are able to track a genuine signal
over the period of one year which validates the stability of our
features with time. Scenario 2 of the Table 1 illustrates the error
rates (FNR and FPR) as well as the required number of averaged
sample points (n) to achieve the reported error rates for all the data
of Blacksburg and Arlington collected on Sep 2018 and 2019. Table
2a shows the results of a more general training-testing procedure
on SatGrid data collected on Sep 2018 using K-fold cross validation.
Similar analysis is performed at Scenario 7 of Table 1 on a selec-
tion of TexBat data to validate the stability of our features over time.
Unlike Scenario 2, both the data used for training and testing in
this case are collected in rich-multipath environment. Fig. 5f shows
the MVN scores of the test data, TexBat:S6, where the MVN model
and the threshold are trained on TexBat:S5. Presence of strong mul-
tipath is the reason for the need to average multiple sample points
(35000 in this case), before making a decision on their authenticity.
5.1.2 Detection and Tracking at Different Locations. Following the
same training process in Sec. 5.1.1, we test the detection and track-
ing of Spotr on the data collected from different locations using
spoofing attacker given as Scenario 1 in Table 1. Fig. 5a shows MVN
scores of the data collected in Missouri, while the original MVN
model and threshold are trained based off of Blacksburg. Using
detection threshold of 1.77e-92 for all of the satellites that appeared
on different days of data collection listed at Table 3, leads to EERs
of zero, which allows us to conclude that we can distinguish the
genuine signals from spoofed ones regardless of the location.
5.1.3 Detection and Tracking in Presence of Multipath. The most
common challenge in spoofing detection of GPS systems is the
multipath effect which makes it difficult to distinguish a genuine
multipath component of GPS signal from the malicious ones. This
problem is elaborated by Wesson et. al [39], and stated as a limita-
tion at [26, 33], however a solution has not been proposed yet. To
investigate the performance of Spotr in presence of multipath we
fit an MVN model to the multipath-free training data, and test it
on rich-multipath data and vice versa for both SatGrid and TexBat
(Scenarios 3, 7, 8 and 9 of Table 1). This round of analysis can help
us understand the extent to which genuine data with multipath
effect can be confused with spoofing data.
The initial set of TexBat data is collected on 2012 using their
first fingerprinting hardware (D1) on a static platform with line
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of sight among which TexBat:S1, S2, S3, and D4 are the multipath-
free ones. Another set from the TexBat repository is collected in a
rich-multipath environment with the same fingerprinter mounted
on a vehicle and driven through a populated area of Texas for a 3
mile. TexBat:S5, and S6 are collected from this “dynamic” platform.
Fig. 5h illustrates the MVN scores of genuine and spoofed data
where model is trained on this rich-multipath data and tested on the
earlier mentioned multipath-free datasets from TexBat D1. Scenario
9 of Table 1 reports the error rates of this analysis with a FNR of
5.23% which means there is a spoofing activity which remains
undetected for this case after using 1000 sample points for a final
decision making on their authenticity. As mentioned earlier at
Sec. 3.1 the VOLK-Library [12] from gnss-sdr that is responsible for
running the dll-pll loops at the GPS receiver, runs at a varying speed
in a feedback system. This is why we cannot translate the number
of undetected malicious sample points to the notion of time and
report the maximum continuous time that a spoofing activity will
remain undetected by Spotr without access to accurate timestamps.
We elaborate on this timing problem in Sec. 5.2 by analyzing the
worst case scenario (strongest attacker: matched-powered replay
attacker on SatGrid) with timestamps.
To further evaluate the robustness of Spotr for all possible cases,
we perform training and testing on the rich-multipath data from
TexBat in Scenario 7 of Table 1, where using multiple sample points
helps us to overcome the influence of multipath on the detec-
tion/tracking process shown in Fig. 5f. We also evaluate Spotr on
SatGrid at Scenarios 3 and 8, where training is done on a multipath-
free (Sep 10, 2019) and rich-multipath data (Aug 23, 2019), respec-
tively. We are able to perform highly accurate detection/tracking
with only one sample point as demonstrated in Fig. 5c and Fig. 5g.
5.1.4 Detection and Tracking against Different Attacks. Table 2b
shows the results of a more general training-testing procedure on
TexBat data collected using D1 2012 using K-fold cross validation
where the spoofing types vary from single time or position, to
simultaneous time and position detailed in Table 4. This analysis
is performed on a mix of multipath-free data (Fig. 5d and Fig. 5e)
and data collected in rich multipath (Fig. 5h) at the same time. The
error rates in the table indicates high FPR and FNR values in some
occasions, caused by using the multipath affected data at training
phase. This shows that genuine data with multipath effect can be
confused with spoofing data if this propagation effect is not taken
into consideration at training stage. To compensate for the reduced
accuracy in the detection/tracking process, we increase the number
of observation sample points and report new rates in Table 2c.
5.1.5 Detection and Tracking using Different Hardware Platforms
as Fingerprinter. The main idea behind our proposed spoofing de-
tection is hardware fingerprinting of the transmitters. This allows
us to hypothesize that the features that we exploit in our algorithm
should change with the signal acquisition platform. In this section,
we validate this by training a model on the data from SatGrid and
testing it on the data from TexBat. Fig. 5i shows that we are not
able to track the genuine data from TexBat fingerprinting hardware
when training a model with SatGrid (the MVN density values of
the genuine data from TexBat all hold value of zero, that is why
they are not printed in logarithmic scale of Y-axis). This is a general
limitation of fingerprinting approaches (even if the platforms are
identical [13]) and can be overcome by training each fingerprinter
on genuine satellite data before deployment.
5.2 Security Analysis: Feature Replay
In this section, we look into the capabilities of our strongest attacker,
where we give the attacker exact same samples as that of a genuine
satellite. Table 3 includes two rounds of SatGrid GPS data collected
on Nov 8, 2019, which unlike all other listed datasets includes
high fidelity timestamps. Data from a matched-power replay attack
associatedwith this data is also given at Table 4. This is the strongest
attacker amongst the ones listed in Table 4 for several reasons. First,
the attacker is capable of estimating and matching its power to the
power level of the genuine GPS signal at the target receiver in a real-
time manner. This represents the best case (unrealistic) scenario
for the attacker as it hides the spoofing activities from not only in-
band power based spoofing detectors but also precludes anomalies
at the complex correlator output tabs of the receiver caused by
the struggle between the genuine and the spoofed signals aiming
to take control of the tracking block [18]. Second, because of our
attack model and data collection setup, some inevitable amount
of delay is inherent to the attacker, which we have removed. In
literature of device fingerprinting [8], this is the strongest attacker.
For any spoofing attack to take place successfully, it is compul-
sory for the attacker to spoof four GPS channels at the receiver
successfully and simultaneously. This is because the PVT solution
solves the linear problem for four unknowns of X, Y, and Z coordi-
nates plus time, and to do so, relies on the information it collects
from at least four channels at the tracking block. According to Ta-
ble 3, SatGrid:G25 collected on Nov 8, 2019 at rooftop of Arlington
includes data from eight PRNs. Hence we look into all possible
combinations of these PRNs that could generate a successful PVT
fix in the receiver. These combinations are called PRN-sets here,
which include 70 cases for eight satellites.
Fig. 6b shows the average of "maximum continuous spoofing
time" for all the PRN-sets when Spotr exploits multiple sample
points in order to perform the detection/tracking process. The
X-axis shows the number of these sample points denoted by n.
The average of "maximum continuous spoofing time" in this case
reduces from 100 s to 47.3 s if 100,000 sample points are used by
Spotr. The figure also reports the “overall continuous spoofing time”
for all of the PRN-sets in the same graph, which is also reduced from
266.6 s to 101.2 s if n=100,000. This shows Spotr’s ability to detect
spoofing activities in 47.3 s in presence of the strongest attacker.
The navigation message consists of 30 s frames which are 1,500
bits long. That is why the number of 30 s locks that a spoofer is
able to remain undetected by Spotr is a more accurate metric for
performance evaluation. Fig. 6c shows the number of 30 s locks
that the spoofer is able to generate for each PRN-set. Spotr is able
to reduce the number of undetected locks from 360 occurrences
when n=1, down to 131 when n=100,000. The number of locks for
the genuine data is given as a bench mark here (plotted in blue
bars) where there are 361 locks for all the PRN-sets. This gives
a high level understanding of the performance of Spotr and does
not translate directly to the continuous spoofing capabilities of the
attacker. The attacker would be detected within the interval of 30 s
locks shown in Fig. 6c.
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Table 1: This table demonstrates the efficacy of Spotr for detection/tracking of spoofed/genuine signals (listed in Tables 3 and
4) across locations, times, in the presence or absence of multipath (MP), and for different attacks using different hardware
platforms (TexBat:D1 and D2 or SatGrid:D3). The table reports thresholds for obtaining equal error rates (EER) of zero at the
training phase, aswell as false positives (FPR) and false negatives (FNR)with the number of required sample point observations
(n) for attaining the reported FPR and FNR at the testing phase. key: The training and testing column include, the general
dataset information, followed by the genuine datasets from device m (Dm) labeled by Dm:Gx and spoofed datasets collected from
Dm labeled by Dm:Sx, with x being the dataset index in the Tables 3 and 4. For the cases that only one dataset is reported (TexBat,
D1 2012) the first 100 s of the data is spoof-free. For example, D3:G1,G2,G3,G4 shows the genuine data collected from SatGrid,
indexed by G1,G2,G3 and G4 in Table 3.
Scenario Train Threshold Test FPR FNR n Plot
1. Location
SatGrid (Blacksburg,∼MP)
D3:G1,G2,G3,G4
D3:S1,S2,S3,S4
1.177e-192
SatGrid (Missouri,∼MP)
D3:G5,G8
D3:S5,S6
0% 0% 1 Fig. 5a
2. Date
SatGrid (Blacksburg,∼MP)
D3:G1
D3:S1
5.15e-186
SatGrid (Blacksburg,∼MP)
D3:G2,G3,G4
D3:S2,S3,S4
0% 0% 1 Fig. 5b
3. MP
SatGrid (Arlington,∼MP)
D3:G23
D3:S8
1.86e-182
SatGrid (Arlington,MP)
D3:G22
D3:S7
0% 0% 1 Fig. 5c
4. Attack (D1) TexBat (Texas,∼MP)D1:S1,S2,S3,S4 4.25e-36
TexBat (Texas,∼MP)
D1:S1,S2,S3,S4 0% 0.96% 500 Fig. 5d
5. Attack (D2)
TexBat (Texas,∼MP)
D2:Clean1
D2:S7,S8
2.56e-38
TexBat (Texas,∼MP)
D2:Clean1
D2:S7,S8
0% 0% 15000 Fig. 5e
6. Hardware
SatGrid (Missouri)
D3:G5,G8
D3:S5,S6
2.6e-33 TexBat (Texas,∼MP)D1:S1,S2,S3,S4 100% 0% 1 Fig. 5i
7. Date TexBat (Texas,MP)D1:S5 7.7e-38
TexBat (Texas)
D1:S6 0% 0% 35000 Fig. 5f
8. ∼MP
SatGrid (Arlington,MP)
D3:G22
D3:S7
1e-80
SatGrid (Arlington,∼MP)
D3:G23
D3:S8
0% 0% 1 Fig. 5g
9. Attack (D1) TexBat (Texas,MP)D1:S5,S6 1.6e-37
TexBat (Texas,∼MP)
D1:S1,S2,S3,S4 0% 5.23% 1000 Fig. 5h
Table 2: (a) Evaluation of detection process for the genuine (G1-G4) and spoofed (S1-S4) data generated by SatGrid (D3) using
FPR and FNR values. (b) 6-fold cross validation on TexBat spoofing scenarios (S1-S6) including both multipath/non-multipath
data for the 2012 fingerprinter (D1) based on one sample point of observation. (c) 6-fold cross validation on TexBat spoofing
scenarios (S2-S6) based on 40,000 sample points of observations.
(a)
Validation
Dataset FPR FNR EER threshold
SatGrid : S1&G1 0% 0% 0.6829 × 10−31
SatGrid : S2&G2 0% 0% 0.5126 × 10−31
SatGrid : S3&G3 0% 0% 0.0138 × 10−31
SatGrid : S4&G4 0% 0% 0.8071 × 10−31
(b)
Validation
Dataset FPR FNR EER Threshold
TexBat : S1 0% 0% 3.6370 × 10−36
TexBat : S2 0% 0% 2.4183 × 10−36
TexBat : S3 0.38% 3.35% 9.4367 × 10−36
TexBat : S4 0.18% 46.8% 9.8347 × 10−37
TexBat : S5 26.29% 0% 2.9695 × 10−35
TexBat : S6 24.48% 0% 2.5882 × 10−35
(c)
Validation
Dataset FPR FNR EER Threshold
TexBat : S1 0% 0% 3.544 × 10−36
TexBat : S2 0% 0% 2.4183 × 10−36
TexBat : S3 0% 0% 2.6983 × 10−35
TexBat : S4 0% 12.5% 1.8412 × 10−35
TexBat : S5 0% 0% 5.519 76 × 10−35
TexBat : S6 0% 0% 3 × 10−35
So far, we can conclude that the number of sample points to be av-
eraged by Spotr, n, is a critical parameter that directly influences the
detection/tracking performance if the attacker is capable of adjust-
ing its power levels. Fig. 6a shows how this number changes with
the SatGrid replay attacker’s power level, when the EER holds the
ideal value of zero for all the power levels. It increases as the under-
powered attacker increases its strength to the matched-powered
level with the genuine data, and reduces again as the power of the
attacker gets far more than that of the genuine signals.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduced a physical-layer identification based
spoofing detector for GPS satellites. Even though the spoofed sig-
nals are as closely phase aligned as possible with their authentic
counterparts, they are never exactly the same as the genuine GPS
signals. In fact a perfect carrier-phase alignment is impossible for a
spoofer. We take advantage of anomalies that are introduced into
the complex correlator outputs of a standard GPS receiver during a
spoofing attack, without depending on the digital information or
the GPS receiver’s solution for position, velocity and time. Hence,
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Figure 5: The results of using Spotr for detection/tracking of spoofed/genuine signals (a) cross locations (b)-(f) cross time (c)-(g)
in the presence or absence of multipath (d)-(e)-(h) for spoofing attacks of TexBat using different hardware platforms (i). At
Figures (a)-(b)-(c) and (g), most of the MVN scores for spoofed signals (depicted by red line) are exact zero values, hence not
printed in the graph with logarithmic scale on Y-axis. Logarithmic scale is used for better visualization.
our algorithm detects if spoofing attacks launched on civil GPS
signals, and prevents the receiver from locking to the spoofed GPS
signals in as few as 47.3 s in worst case scenario. We validated our
method by testing it on the de-facto standard of a publicly available
repository of GPS signal spoofing traces called the Texas Spoofing
Battery (TexBat), as well as our data (SatGrid) collected over several
months at multiple locations in United States. More specifically,
we are able to detect spoofing activities and track genuine signals
over different times and locations and propagation effects related
to environmental conditions.
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A APPENDIX
Table 3 details the authentic satellite data collection, and Table 4
the spoofed data collection for Sec. 4.
WiSec ’20, July 8–10, 2020, Linz (Virtual Event), Austria Foruhandeh et al.
Table 3: Genuine datasets. SatGrid is the data that we collected at Blacksburg and Arlington, and TexBat is the data provided
by Radionavigation Lab in UT Austin detailed in Sec. 4.4 collected by their 2015 hardware platform (D2).
Dataset collection date multipath duration start time location PRNs
TexBat:clean July 2015 No 420 s – Texas {3,6,7,13,16,19,23}
TexBat:clean July 2015 Yes 420 s – Texas {9,15,18,22}
SatGrid:G1 Sep 24, 2018 No 60 min 8:11 am Blacksburg {1,7,8,9,11,18,27,28}
SatGrid:G2 Sep 25, 2018 No 60 min – Blacksburg {1,7,8,9,11,18,27,28}
SatGrid:G3 Sep 26, 2018 No 60 min – Blacksburg {1,7,8,9,11,18,27,28}
SatGrid:G4 Sep 28, 2018 No 60 min 4:10 pm Blacksburg {1,7,8,9,11,18,27,28}
SatGrid:G5 Dec 15, 2018 No 60 min 12 pm Missouri {10,14,20,21,32}
SatGrid:G6 Dec 15, 2018 No 60 min 2 pm Missouri {14,22,25,31,32}
SatGrid:G7 Dec 15, 2018 No 60 min 8 pm Missouri {7,8,9,27,30}
SatGrid:G8 Dec 16, 2018 No 60 min 2 am Missouri {2,6,12,17,19}
SatGrid:G9 Dec 16, 2018 No 60 min 3:30 pm Missouri {3,14,22,26,31}
SatGrid:G10 Dec 16, 2018 No 60 min 7 pm Missouri {7,8,9,23,27}
SatGrid:G11 Dec 16, 2018 No 60 min 9 pm Missouri {1,7,8,11,30}
SatGrid:G12 Dec 16, 2018 No 60 min 11 pm Missouri {1,17,19,28,30}
SatGrid:G13 Dec 17, 2018 No 60 min 6 am Missouri {7,11,17,28,30}
SatGrid:G14 Dec 17, 2018 No 60 min 12 pm Missouri {10,14,20,31,32 }
SatGrid:G15 Dec 17, 2018 No 60 min 10 pm Missouri {2,5,13,15,29}
SatGrid:G16 Dec 18, 2018 No 60 min 4 am Missouri {2,5,6,12,25}
SatGrid:G17 Dec 18, 2018 No 60 min 11 am Missouri {10,14,18,20,32}
SatGrid:G18 Dec 18, 2018 No 60 min 2 pm Missouri {3,14,22,31,32}
SatGrid:G19 Dec 18, 2018 No 60 min 11 pm Missouri {1,11,17,19,28}
SatGrid:G20 Dec 19, 2018 No 60 min 9 am Missouri {10,15,20,21,24}
SatGrid:G21 Dec 20, 2018 No 60 min 9 pm Missouri {1,11,13,18,28}
SatGrid:G22 Aug 23, 2019 yes 10 min 4 pm Arlington (urban) {2,13,15,21,29}
SatGrid:G23 Sep 10, 2019 No 45 min 3 pm Arlington (football field) {2,5,8,15,17,21,24,29}
SatGrid:G24 2 Nov 8, 2019 No 45 min 10 am Arlington (rooftop) {2,24,13,15,20,5,21,29}
SatGrid:G25 Nov 8, 2019 No 50 min 11 am Arlington (rooftop) {10,24,13,15,20,5,21,29}
Table 4: Spoofed datasets. There are different hardware platforms (fingerprinters) that are used for generating them. The
fingerprinter of TexBat on 2012 (D1) is different from TexBat 2015 (D2). SatGrid attacker also has a separate hardware (D3).
Dataset collection date spoofing type threat model spoofing power status multipath duration location
TexBat:S1 Sep 2012 both Replay under-powered No 420 s Texas
TexBat:S2 Sep 2012 time Replay over-powered No 420 s Texas
TexBat:S3 Sep 2012 time Replay matched-powered No 420 s Texas
TexBat:S4 Sep 2012 position Replay matched-powered No 420 s Texas
TexBat:S5 Sep 2012 time Replay over-powered Yes 420 s Texas
TexBat:S6 Sep 2012 position Replay matched-powered Yes 420 s Texas
TexBat:S7 July 2015 time Replay matched-powered No 420 s Texas
TexBat:S8 July 2015 time Replay matched-powered No 420 s Texas
SatGrid:S1 Sep 24, 2018 both Spoofing over-powered No 60 min Blacksburg
SatGrid:S2 Sep 25, 2018 both Spoofing over-powered No 60 min Blacksburg
SatGrid:S3 Sep 26, 2018 both Spoofing over-powered No 60 min Blacksburg
SatGrid:S4 Sep 28, 2018 both Spoofing over-powered No 60 min Blacksburg
SatGrid:S5 Dec 15, 2018 both Spoofing over-powered No 60 min Missouri
SatGrid:S6 Dec 16, 2018 both Spoofing over-powered No 60 min Missouri
SatGrid:S7 Aug 23, 2019 both Replay adjusted-power No 10 min Arlington
SatGrid:S8 Sep 10, 2019 both Replay adjusted-power No 45 min Arlington
SatGrid:S9 Nov 8, 2019 both Replay adjusted-power No 50 min Arlington
SatGrid:S10 Nov 8, 2019 both Replay adjusted-power No 50 min Arlington
2SatGrid:G24 and SatGrid:G25 have high fidelity timestamps.
